Sunday, December 31, 2006
Maybe. We do know that 2006 was not. Or at least not in terms of overall investment in the societal implications of technology and of nanotechnology more particularly. On the other hand, there was some good news. The two Centers for Nanotechnology in Society got up and running! Less parochially, nano and its health implications were in the news, and worldwide public health became a bigger issue than ever thanks to some great research, and activism, and philanthropic attention, and celebrity interest ranging from Bill and Melinda Gates to Brad and Angelina, as faithful readers of Pittwatch.com can attest.
Speaking of Brad Pitt, what does get people to use technology in a widespread way? What will get them to adopt nanotechnology? Gerald Barnett and I geared up our research on this question of "uptake," and though our focus is on industry's uptake of academic research, societal uptake of industry products is closely related. Sometimes uptake is driven by huge national initiatives: Business 2.0 is predicting for 2007 the beginnings of a race between India and China to get to the moon. U.S. high-tech was driven by that kind of massive federal spending for a couple of generations. This public investment - spurred by a range of motives, mostly defensive, protected and promoted technology that had no market support and no chance of mass adoption for years or in some cases decades. ARPANET, the main Internet precursor, is one obvious example of a technology that transformed the economy, but only about 30 years after its first working models went operational. 20-30 years is a bench-to-bedside norm: many predictions for nanotechnology cut that in half, and then cut it in half again. I hope so. But what are the drivers?
Which reminds me of Brad. Cynics say the Internet is sponsored by unembarrassing access to porn. Judging from 2006's search demographics, the Internet is actually sponsored by Brad Pitt. More broadly, it is sponsored by gossip about celebrities. Dan Mitchell at the New York Times reported yesterday that the top search term at Yahoo was "Britney Spears," and that most of the other top search terms were for sites that allow people to bid themselves out as celebrities - Bebo was Number One at Google, and MySpace was Number Two.
People also search for really basic things on line that they would otherwise have to stand up to look at - weather reports, dictionary definitions, and maps. There's a basic utility to the Internet that complements its effectiveness as a tool of social curiosity. But I keep coming back to the fact that this apparently infinite appetite for the Internet and for its underlying technology took decades to evolve. Much of it was self-organized. What about the societal uptake of various nanotechnologies?
The first thing to say is that uptake will not be linear - tech uptake never has been. This means that it could be much faster than the Internet model suggests, or not. The second is that in 2006 much of the discussion of nano-uptake was Kurzweilized, meaning it assumed that an advancing technology creates its own uptake. This is unfortunately not true, as innumerable articles and books by high tech business scholars and consultants attest (remember "Crossing the Chasm"?). Much or most demand is created, nurtured, and gradually built through various forms of social investment (some but not all via government funding of R&D) - hence the importance of Sputnik and Apollo in creating what we can call the public imagination of the meaning of a technology that in turn creates its use.
One of the great "crossing the chasm" business scholars is Clayton Christensen of the Harvard Business School, who burst on the scene almost ten years ago with The Innovator's Dilemma. He reminded me of a more ominous possibility for nanotech in an interview in the business section of today's New York Times. He's talking about health care, and he addresses the obvious fact of the American system's bloated cost and huge inefficiency. But he is not advocating something like a single-payer system of the kind that operates in Canada and in most countries in Europe. He calls instead for the greater "commoditization" of health care. This means increasing the simplicity, accessibility, and affordability of health care by in effect automating as much of it as possible. "Rather than replicating the expensive expertise of Mount Sinai Medical Center or Mass General Hospital or replicating the expensive expertise of doctors, we have to commoditize their expertise."
Christensen's claim here is consistent with his books' analyses of all other high-tech industries: the real savings - and the real profits- are in moving down the commodity chain, not up. Sustainable profits lie in lowering high-tech, not in raising high-tech even higher. Many tech revolutionaries think that people like Christensen define "disruptive technology" as breakthrough technology, the kind that is 10x smaller, 10x faster, 10x smarter, 10x better. Au contraire. The truly disruptive for Christensen is the truly average version of a technology - one that was breakthrough a few years or decades ago. Accessibility (and big revenues) came to PCs, for example, when "Michael Dell could assemble one of these things in his dorm room."
The good news: disruptive technology can be adopted on a mass scale. The bad news: mass adoption is always of technology that in the scientific sense is no longer disruptive. The process of development for mass adoption, in other words, is discontinuous with advanced research. To cross the chasm between development and adoption you need to widen the chasm between development and research. Developers and researchers have different interests and goals, and developers naturally want to minimize research costs. This means developers will not flood basic research with money. Thus there will never be a venture capital-funded nano version of the Manhattan Project or even of ARPANET.
This brings me back to the question of the drivers of nano-uptake. You can't commoditize nanoscale scientific research, so who will pay for it? The answer is going to be societal. My nano New Year's resolution is to know much more one year from now about the drivers behind the future uptake of our group's selected nanotechnologies.
Whatever your role in all this, Happy New Year!
Saturday, December 30, 2006
Sunday, December 24, 2006
Monday, December 18, 2006
It's notable in light of the flood of federal funding that came after 1998, a year in which (according to this study) the feds spent about $150 million on nano-realted research. Also, for some reason, the host URL indicates a repository in Iran. Further probing shows that this report is on the site of the Iranian Nanotechnology Policy Studies Committee:
The report includes a useful bibliography and it offers some sense of what policy issues were before the NNI era and the factor of ten increase in funding that accompanied it. For instance, it cites NASA as probably making "the most extensive effort" in supporting nano and also notes DARPA's ULTRA program aimed at developing "ultra dense, ultra fast computing components/nanoelectronics."
Hmmm...space and electronics.
Saturday, December 16, 2006
Patrick McCray and Arie Rip are certainly right about the dangers of "folk theories." The world is full of these things and is often run by them. Empires rise and fall on the basis of mythological histories. Weekend potsmoking leads to heroin addition, premarital kissing to teen pregnancy, welfare to dependency, free trade to untold riches - or so our folk theories say.
Still, the false analogies on which these theories rest can provoke lots of creative thinking, as long as we remain aware that the analogies are imperfect. So here's another one between nanotech and biotech. In the midst of Wall Street's celebrations of their extreme bonuses - averaging $623,000 per employee at Goldman Sachs, for example - there have been articles about tech stocks that haven't done so well. One is Sun Microsystems, a company that over the years has produced much interesting strategizing about commercial versions of open-standard and even open-source, but that may now be in irreversible decline. This is not particularly good news for tech industry in general, which is overly-dependent on proprietary systems that, for reasons I'll blog about later, are increasingly difficult to protect (even assuming we should). But back to my point: Another piece in the Wall Street Journal talks about the drastic response of capital markets to failed drug trials. Herb Greenberg writes,
The six most expensive words for investors in drug or biotech companies are: "This is money in the bank." Nuvelo Inc. and NeoPharm Inc. proved that convincingly this past week, with a substantial amount of their value wiped out after reporting disappointing late-stage clinical trial results. And let's not forget the recent brouhaha when Pfizer Inc. abruptly halted trials of its torcetrapib "good cholesterol" drug following unexpected deaths.
Greenberg goes on to cite David Miller, an analyst at Biotech Stock Research, saying that only one out of every ten biotech companies succeeds. Since the nerves of biotech investors are permanently on edge, one bad trial can cause a company to lose half its value in one day, or, in some cases, all of it forever. Remember Shaman Pharmeceuticals, innovators in treatments for a range of common illnesses that damage everyday life and productivity in many tropical nations? You don't, but I do. It was my first investment ever - a tip from a biotech researcher friend, of course, sometime around 1997. One month my $2000 was still hanging in there at around $1650. The next month some shift in the wind meant that my stock was delisted and my two grand had been turned into 19 cents. Which I then grew back to $1.95 through weeks of brilliant day trading, but that's another story.
What the hell - that's life on the tech frontier, right? Big downs, but also the big ups. You rolls the dice, you takes your chances. Well maybe you do, if you're the type that plays the slots in Nevada's state line casinos. Professional investors don't roll the dice and do minimize risk - that's the only way they can win more often than they lose, and win big rather than win small. Investors quite rationally look for low rather than high risk for a given expected return.
This means that investors do not love research, in spite of how smart money always claims to be funding smart products and new industries: economists like Richard Nelson and Kenneth Arrow showed almost fifty years go that fundamental research is very risky research. Biotech is a good example. Over thirty years after the Cohen-Boyer patents on recombinant DNA technology launched the age of biotech, companies in the field have a 90% failure rate. Most of these failed companies have been based on strong, promising research: they fail because it was "only" research, and investors are looking for products, sales, and revenues.
This raises two crucial questions.
1. will private investors properly fund nanotechnological research?
2. will private investors fund this research through its inevitable ups and downs?
Though we often ask such questions, we don't know the answers - not for the diverse fields that make up nanotech, and not for biotech either How many great biotech ideas never found (or later lost) their investors and still sit on a shelf in the dark?
By the way, here are "year-in-review" figures for 2006:
University of California 10-campus federal research funds, no DOE labs:$2.2 billion
National Nanotechnology Initative (NNI) budget, all agencies, :$1.06 billion
NNI budget, risk analysis (Wilson Center estimate): $0.011 billion
Goldman Sachs, 2006 year-end funds to distribute as bonuses: $16.5 billion
Just one good year's bonus pool at a leading Wall Street investment bank could pay for seven years of systemwide research, sixteen years of the National Nanotechnology Initiatve, and, um, sixteen centuries of nano-related risk analysis. We'd better get going!
Friday, December 15, 2006
It asked if the public interested in nano because they believe the new technologies will transform their lives or simply improve them incrementally. The essay concludes that the former is the real reason the public and policy makers supported nano in the first place. It is these fantastic and far-out visions "in which politicians think they are investing."
Read more at:
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Now, the two ideas - one is the suggestion, which I've made here before, that the story of GMOs does not necessarily make the best narrative to understand nanotechnology. For instance, in Vicki Colvin's 2003 speech to the US Congress, she refers to the "wow-to-yuck" trajectory GMOs took and suggests this offers a "powerful lesson here for nanotechnoloy." While the story may be attractive and provide a way for opponents and advocates to get traction, Rip nicely points out that the analogy is flawed for the simple historical reason that in terms of genetic engineering, "critical debate - the yuck in Colvin's folk theory - was present from the beginning." There was, in other words, no wow-to-yuck; public apprehension about gene tinkering went back well into the 1970s. Nevertheless, media stories and even scholarly papers about nano and risk reflexively cite GMO story and frame it in the context of a (questionable) hype-disappointment cycle.
The second point Rip makes revolves around what he calls nanophobia-phobia. This boils down to the idea that much of the concerns about public fears originates with "nanotech actors and other insiders and commentators." As a result, "concerns about possible public concern is getting a life of its own." One bit of evidence - even among the small part of the population that read Prey, more people finished the book more interested and positive about nanotech.
Rip nicely uses a historical example from the chemistry community in which 1982 studies he did showed that "chemists were more positive about chemistry than the general public, but also that the general public was not very negative about chemistry, and definitely less negative than the chemists thought they would be."
Are those on the inside of the nano-enterprise projecting their own fears about a negative reaction onto the public? And what analogies work best to help us understand nano's past and current context? Rip's article suggests these are issues to consider further.
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
Samsung has been developing a line of antimicrobial nanotechnology that uses silver particles to kill bacteria and viruses. The EPA has decided to regulate the effluent from these machines as pesticide waste. I read about this in Chemical and Engineering News.
Instead of using heat, the team at IBM used a small electrical current to bring about a phase transition, allowing them to build memory cells that can store 0's and 1's based on their state. The nano part comes in with the size of the switches - according to the NYT, they are 3 nanometers high by 20 nanometers wide. The article doesn't mention how the switches were made.
While clearly a variation of nanotechnology, this term itself isn't referenced in the article. This makes me wonder about the divergence of the nano-label as applied to real, functioning nanoscale devices and the manufacture (and concerns over) passive nano-scale particles.
Sunday, December 10, 2006
What do we see if we apply this questions to issues around nanotechnology? What was the "problem" that resulted in in the passage of the NNI in 2000? One could argue, for instance, that it was the future of the electronics and semiconductor industries or levels of funding for the physical sciences. And, today, how has the problem of environmental, health, and safety issues been defined and by whom? Who owns this problem?
Problem definition and problem ownership - two ideas to think about when considering past and current issues around nano-policy.
Thursday, December 07, 2006
Tuesday, December 05, 2006
Steven Currall (Professor in the Faculty of Engineering Sciences at University College London) asked the salient question "is the public obsessed with risk?" Drawing on a paper that appears n the December 2006 issue of Nature Nanotechnology, he concludes "no." People, he says, consider both risks as well as benefits when buying "nanotech products" (makes sense to me).
Neal Lane (former Presidential Science Advisor to Clinton) also spoke on policy implications re: nano. He asked whether nano's potential would be lost amidst the welter of concerns about risk and the failure to educate/engage the public. He made the case that the public is currently neutral about nano and only needs more information to reach a (presumably) positive conclusion.
A few thoughts - while I tuned in late (the web page wouldn't load properly for some reason), I heard no reference to the work (or the existence) at either the CNS-UCSB or its counterpart at ASU. Although there were calls for a better and more coordinated national strategy to deal with EHS issues, I found this ironic given that neither of the two national centers founded to deal with societal implications were referred to.
Finally, I recalled that, about a year ago, a colleague at a conference asked me if all this interest in nano-and-society wasn't part of an effort to create future nano-consumers. At the time, I thought this was a cynical interpretation. Sure, this might be part of the motivation. However, what I heard in this web cast is encouraging me to think about this more seriously. How much of this focus on EHS is driven by concerns high up in the federal government that some event - even a bogus (i.e. no-nano) event - might, as Lane put it, derail "nano's potential to revolutionize all other technologies"?
Monday, December 04, 2006
What might make this interesting - remember that WW puts out a great deal of materials, news clippings, reports, etc. on nano, especially with regard to EHS and risk issues - is that the topic is "what makes the public embrace and buy nanotechnology?"
I find this interesting as much of the focus thus far has been on the supply side - what is being produced, what are economic benefits, etc. This webcast potentially presents the story from a different angle - that of the consumer. Commodities do not appear unbidden on our shelves. Behind each one is some perceived consumer demand. And understanding what consumers want (and don't want) is one way to analyzing what gets produced. In other words, focusing on the interplay between consumer demand and industry response might yield a more complex and informative view of the nano-enterprise.
A follow-up on this line of questioning would be: what are consumers thinking of when they "buy nano?" Is it objectively better products? Or is it the newness, the novelty, and the sexiness of nano? And, if it is the latter, what is their vision of nano that motivated them? My guess is that underneath all of it is the glitzy, sci-fi, nanobot vision. Public imagination informs and shapes public policy. QED.
Saturday, December 02, 2006
The reports (along with a similar work stemming from a September 2000 societal implications meeting) can be found at: http://www.wtec.org/SocietalImplications/
Thursday, November 30, 2006
Will the real nano please stand up? As scholars and policy makers from a variety of fields grapple with the potential societal implications of nanotechnology, one of the first hurdles they must overcome is definitional. Indeed, the term “nanotechnology” itself is problematic. Nanotech isn’t a particular thing or process. It is more accurate (although less convenient) to speak of nanotechnologies.
Nanotechnologies already span a wide range of materials, processes, and devices. Most commonly considered of late are passive nanoscale particles incorporated into commercial products. When the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies released an inventory earlier this year of nano-products, nearly 60 percent related to health and fitness. While hardly novel – humans have been able to make and manipulate nanosize particles for centuries – the types of materials and their presence in quotidian products like cosmetics has generated considerable amount of recent media attention when nano’s possible risks are discussed.
The second major category in the Woodrow Wilson inventory covers products which integrate nanoscale features into actual devices such as computer chips. Unfortunately, the category masks the ubiquity of these products in everyday life. Downhill skis and tennis rackets with embedded nanoparticles receive the same analytical weight as electronic goods already in homes and offices around the globe. Such inventories also often neglect devices made via nanofabrication techniques such as 700 million or so diode lasers made annually via epitaxial deposition. While the Woodrow Wilson catalog is an excellent first stage, more information about the economic impact of these various products and independent verification of their ‘nano-ness’ might provide nano-and-society researchers with a more refined sense of perspective and scale.
A third aspect of nanotechnology, far removed from the realm of passive nanoscale particles, is what, for many, galvanized their initial interest, enthusiasm, and even dread about the possibilities of nanotechnology. Not yet represented in commercial inventories, active nanostructures, nanobots, and self-guided molecular assemblers stood at the heart of the whole Drexlerian vision of building a future world, or at least future products, from the bottom up.
In late September 2006, the National Research Council (NRC) released its triennial review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). The report, titled A Matter of Size, discusses these different facets of the nano-enterprise. Over twenty experts from industry, national laboratories, and universities prepared it while dozens more offered input on topics ranging from “Responsible Development of Nanotechnology” to “Technology Transfer and Economic Impacts.” The NRC report praises the interagency collaboration that has enabled funding more than twenty centers for research on nanotechnology. Interestingly, the two national Centers for Nanotechnology in Society – funded more than a year ago at the University of California, Santa Barbara and Arizona State University – were not included in the report’s list of national centers nor mentioned in the chapter devoted to “Responsible Development of Nanotechnology.”
Substantial press coverage accompanied the report’s release. On September 26, for instance, The New York Times’s business section (where the Times presents most of its nano news) reported how the NRC panel offered a “hopeful but guarded analysis” of the U.S.’s broad performance in nanotechnology research. A close reading of A Matter of Size provides some valuable insights into the state of nanoscale research in development in the United States. Included in its 143 pages are evaluations of the effectiveness of federal agencies in coordinating nanotech research, comparative information on national publication and patenting rates, and the environmental, health, and safety issues associated with nano.
The authors of A Matter of Size are quite explicit in their opinion that, rather than a discrete thing or technique, nanotechnology is an enabling technology. Much like rocket developments enabled the exploration of the space frontier and the exploitation of space for military and commercial uses, nanotechnologies have the potential to open up the nano frontier. In fact, one might think of the NNI’s focus on building up, as the NRC report says, a “robust R&D infrastructure” in the same manner that NASA’s creation in 1958 helped catalyze capabilities in aerospace and aeronautics technologies.
Different aspects of nano’s identity emerge in the report’s chapter on economic impact. Referencing a 2004 report from Lux Research, the NRC panel concludes that “the nanotechnology value chain cuts from nano-materials to nano-intermediates to nano-enabled products.” This fact is often missing in generalized discussion regarding nano’s potential benefits and risks – when one talks nano, which nano is it? Is it low-tech nanoparticles in food and cosmetics? Or electronics with nanoscale features? Obviously both. However, it is the former flavor that has received the bulk of the attention public opinion surveys, NGO reports, and testimony to Congress about nanotech’s potential risks.
When scientists and policy makers introduced the NNI in 2000, they did so with bold rhetorical flourishes that highlighted nano’s transformative potential for the U.S. economy. In fact, the multi-agency report that first presented the NNI was subtitled “Leading to the Next Industrial Revolution.” Inside, readers were told that sometime in the “early 21st century” nano “will have a profound impact on our economy and society.”
As federal funding for nanotechnology increased and then stabilized, policy makers tempered this rhetoric somewhat. A 2003 report accompanying President Bush’s FY 2004 budget request for the NNI included the phrase “research and development supporting the next industrial revolution” in its title with little focus in the text given to the time scale on which this transformation might occur.
The new NRC report follows this trend and offers a measured assessment of how far in the distance the nano-revolution appears. Just like the “20-40 year period for the development of computing and communications technologies,” nano is a “long-term undertaking whose goals and benefits will take time to realize.” While less dramatic than initial pronouncements regarding nano’s implications for the U.S. economy, the NRC report accurately notes that technological “revolutions” are rarely simple or swift.
When Congress passed Public Law 108-153, it specifically asked the NRC to do a one-time study of “the technical feasibility of molecular self-assembly.” The fifth chapter of the NRC report, although not discussed in The New York Times, returns to some of nano’s historical roots as it dutifully fulfills the Congressional mandate.
The inclusion of molecular self-assembly references a third flavor of nanotechnology and one that, arguably, stimulated much of the original interest in nanotechnology. The concept of molecular assemblers harks back to the relatively early days of nano, at least in terms of its promotion and presentation to the public. In the 1980s, K. Eric Drexler forcefully advocated for the idea that new materials and devices could be fabricated from the bottom-up using atoms and molecules as basic building blocks. It was this vision of “molecule-by-molecule” control that Drexler described, for example, in 1992 at a Congressional hearing convened by then-Senator Albert Gore.
Drexler’s vision of hypothetical autonomous assemblers was taken up and elaborated on by scores of science-fiction writers. It also is the vision of nanotechnology that the public thinks of first according to a forthcoming article by Waldron et al. in The Journal of Nanoparticle Research. If nothing else, scenarios of nanobots either running amok or working productively to “manufacture complex, large-scale industrial objects” sit at the heart of the nano-vision. Drexler’s vision represents another part of nanotechnology’s identity and one that has received considerable hostility from the mainstream scientific community – witness the infamous ‘debate’ between Drexler and the late Richard Smalley in 2003 in the pages of Chemical and Engineering News.
Few studies of nano have carefully considered the role of the more fantastical portrayals of nanotechnology in shaping the public’s perception. A 2004 study by Cobb and Macoubrie did look at the possible effects of Michael Crichton’s novel Prey but the results were inconclusive. Only about 10% of the people polled had read it. Here, I suggest, analogies with the early days of space exploration or the decades before nuclear fission was a scientific reality may be more important than recognized.
While the NRC panel did not dismiss the Drexlerian vision entirely, it concluded that it was best relegated to “visionary engineering analysis” for now. In making its point, the panel drew a historical analogy with space exploration. This was an interesting departure as GMOs and biotech are invoked most frequently as potential analogs for understanding nano’s benefits and risks. The idea of molecular self-assembly was akin, the report said, to the early 20th century writings of visionaries like Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and those researchers today who are designing space elevators based on “hypothetical carbon nanotube composite materials.”
Another useful analogy can be drawn from the history of space flight, as well. During the Cold War, the government supported space technologies as instruments of state power and prestige. Concomitantly, the American public mobilized behind a vision of space travel that matched what movies and fiction presented – moon bases, trips to Mars, and so forth. It is doubtful that a vision based on the current state of affairs – a science-shorn space station or a space-capable SUV (otherwise known as the Space Shuttle) – could have galvanized such wide support.
When he testified to Congress in 1999 in support of the NNI, Richard Smalley noted that exploring the nano-frontier could inspire a new cohort of youngsters just as space exploration had motivated his generation. With federal support of nano research and development running at over a billion dollars per year, will the American public be satisfied with “low-tech nano?” Does toothpaste-with-nanoparticles have the ability to inspire future engineers and scientists?
Giving more attention to how “visionary engineering analyses” can shape people’s current perceptions and future expectations could add a valuable extra dimension to the nano-and-society research plan. Along similar lines, despite its mandate to carry out a one-time evaluation of molecular self-assembly, perhaps the NRC will revisit the topic again and consider how this over-the-horizon aspect of nanotechnology stimulates, if not the economy, then the public’s imagination.
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
"29 November 2006, CORDIS
The economic development of nanotechnology
After the two predecessors "Some figures about nanotechnology R&D in Europe and beyond", published in December 2005 and "Results of the informal collection of inputs for nanotechnology R&D in the field of (eco) toxicology", published in June 2006, this article analyses the economic development of nanotechnology.
The present analyses are based on indicators of the economic development of nanotechnology that can be publicly accessed. A focus has been put on the analysis of Europe compared to its main competitors".
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Second, I wanted to survey any historically relevant materials that Foresight has. Christine and the Foresight staff have been very welcoming and I had a chance to look through some 30 odd boxes of papers, books, etc. in storage. Most of these were either books or financial materials. However, there are some very interesting materials pertaining to the Foresight conferences from 1989 onwards as well as copies of hard to find articles and lectures authored by Peterson, Eric Drexler, et al.. Many of these I never would have known about without taking this trip.
An added bonus to my visit is getting the chance to look through the extensive collection of media clippings that mention nano, Foresight, or Drexler. These go back to 1986 and fill two tightly packed file drawers. The sheer number of articles etc. point to two things. One is that the history of nano, with its connections to space exploration and so forth, are firmly rooted in the 1980s with Drexler's initial work in this area going back to the mid-1970s. Also, worth noting is the extreme level of interest the media had in nano, Foresight, and Drexler. Through a myriad array of articles, editorials and so forth, both specialized communities as well as the public in general had the opportunity to read about nano long before the federal government and the NNI moved into the picture.
This media coverage (and accompanying business/VC interest) created a fertile ground for the NNI to grow. Perhaps, more importantly, the role of public imagination and interest in supporting science/technology policy is not to be underestimated. For a historical analogy, think of the decades of "pump priming" on the part of Walt Disney, Hugo Gernsback, Chesley Bonestell, Werner von Braun, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, David Lasser, and many others in the years and decades before Sputnik. For another example that might appeal to chemists, check out Frederick Soddy's The Interpretation of Radium and consider the interplay of science and futurist speculation it contains.
Germehausen Professor of Materials Science and Engineering and Biological Engineering, MIT
Monday, December 4, 2006
2:00 pm / Refreshments at 1:40 pm
1001 Engineering Science Building
A Biological Tool-Kit for the Synthesis and Assembly of Materials for Electronics and Energy
The Institute for Collaborative Biotechnologies is honored to present a seminar by Angela Belcher. Professor Belcher is an alumna of UCSB, with a B.S. in biology from the College Creative Studies, and a Ph.D. in organic chemistry. In June 2006, the UCSB Alumni Association presented her with a Distinguished Achievement Award.
Professor Belcher serves as the MIT coordinator for the ICB. Her research uses nature as a guide in making novel materials for electronics and energy. She was named “Research Leader of the Year” by Scientific American in 2006 for "the use of custom-evolved viruses to advance nanotechnology.” She has received many national awards, including a prestigious MacArthur Foundation "genius" fellowship for her extraordinary work in bionanotechnology.
Saturday, November 25, 2006
Friday, November 24, 2006
Anyway, I thought this might be a good time to talk a little about my interview protocols and how they might differ from what other CNS folks are doing. It also might help explain why it takes so long to get an oral history interview "done."
The process I use is thus:
1. Prepare for the interview. I tend to follow a general set of questions and am primarily interested in eliciting people's recollections about events, their memories, and so forth. I usually work from a person's CV and follow a somewhat biographical approach. A general rule of thumb is that, for about every hour of interview time, roughly 2-3 hours of preparation goes into setting out questions and doing background research on your subject. Nothing is worse than showing up to interview someone and realizing you haven't taken the time to learn the basics of their research or career. It wastes time and is unprofessional. Also, at the beginning of the interview, I explain the process and what is involved. I find it useful, especially when dealing with people who have been interviewed by reporters, to explain that historians work differently and have differing professional practices than journalists. I often find it useful to make this explicit by pointing out that nothing they say can be used by me without their permission, etc..
2. Conduct the interview. More on this some other time. Once the interview is done - Kalil's lasted about 2 hours - the interview is transcribed. Mary Ingram did this one; other interviews I did are transcribed by the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics.
3. Once I have the transcript, I listen to the interview again and read the transcript simultaneously. This is my chance to correct major mistakes, correct spelling of tech terms, etc..
4. The interview then goes to the interviewee to review. This is often a major bottleneck as interviewees are busy and don't often have time to edit the transcript. Kalil, happily, turned his transcript around quickly. But this is their chance to add more detail, correct errors, etc.. It is also a chance for them to note any passages they deem controversial and want sealed. They can stipulate these terms in their consent form.
5. I receive the edited transcript and read over it once more. I also request that the interviewee sign a consent form giving permission to use the interview for scholarly purposes, etc.. Without a proper consent form or some written agreement as to use of the interview, the oral history is worthless except for background information. Verbal assent is OK as a temporary measure but should be followed up with a written form.
6. At this point, I consider the interview essentially done. I send a copy of the final transcript to the interviewee for their files; they keep a copy of signed consent form as well. It is only at this point - unless I've made some other interim arrangement - that the interview can be used for research purposes. Hopefully, the interview will go to a formal scholarly repository where it will be available for others to use. I am sending copies of mine to AIP; Cyrus Mody (one of my collaborators) has a similar arrangement with the Chemical Heritage Foundation. Few things are more frustrating than knowing that someone did some fabulous interviews for their own book etc. but that they were never transcribed, cannot be consulted, and in essence aren't available for others to use. This is akin to having a private stash of historically relevant documents that others cannot use to confirm or refute any points made with them.
It's a lengthy process. Thus far, for CNS, I've interviewed about 8 people. All of these are in various stages of completion. As interviews are done, we'll post them on the CNS web site and they are, according to the terms of the consent form, available for general use provided people follow the guidelines and rules set out at the beginning of the transcript.
At a later time - I'll talk some about preparing a good and cogent set of interview questions.
Thursday, November 23, 2006
David Berube (U. South Carolina) has a nano-oriented blog:
Those of you interested in issues of risk perception, regulation, etc. might find it of interest.
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
337 organizations worldwide were contacted, 64 responded.
Telephone interviews, written and web-based surveys. Responses were self-reported and not independently verified.
Respondents believe that there are special risks related to nanomaterials. However, their actual environmental health and safety practices did not significantly depart from standard hazardous material handling.
Few monitored the workplace for airborne nanoparticles or provided guidance to consumers regarding disposal.
Nearly half of organizations implementing nano-specific environmental health and safety programs described the practices as a precaution against unknown hazards.
The entire report text is available online, as well as a two page executive summary (link).
Scanning electron micrograph of a prototype 'nanoknife' shows a single carbon nanotube stretched between two tungsten needles. Triangular probe is the tip of an atomic force cantilever used to determine the breaking point of the knife. (Color added for clarity) Image: Courtesy NIST/CU
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
The Nanorex website describes the software:
NanoEngineer-1™ is a 3-D molecular engineering program. It includes both a sophisticated CAD module for the design and modeling of atomically precise components and assemblies, and a molecular dynamics module for simulating the movement and operation of mechanical nanodevices. NanoEngineer-1 is currently under development and is scheduled for release in spring 2007.
Image source: Copyright 2006, Nanorex
Within the site's download area, you can find specifications for the various machines shown in the gallery, including length, width, and number of atoms.
Monday, November 20, 2006
Nano Fever Hits the Bay Area
Jennifer introduces the conference, nanotechnology and its significance.
Cancer-Fighting "Molecular Velcro"
Work towards a nano-based "smart cancer sensor" therapy
Rate Your Favorite Nanotech Start-Up!
Comments on the Lux Research report on nanotech startup strategies.
Quote of the Day
An entry on Intel's Michael Mayberry talk. His main point was that the most promising R&D on nanoelectronics focuses on the less complex.
...But He Didn't Inhale
Coverage of the Woodrow Wilson Institute's Andrew Maynard talk on overseeing nanotechnology risk.
It's All About the Wireless
Wireless power transmission.
Where To Get Your Nano On
Jennifer enumerates the nano blogs of note.
Richard Feynman's optimism for nanotechnology stemmed from the tiny workings of nature.
Here Comes the Sun
About colloidal nanocrystals and photovoltaics
That's a Wrap!
A summary of a few other interesting items from the conference:
- inorganic colloidal nanocrystals as an alternative to quantum dots in fluorescent biological labeling applications
- environmental remediation with zero-valent iron nanoparticles
- recent advances in laser wakefield accelerators. Applications include drivers for light sources and high-energy particle acceleration.
Saturday, November 18, 2006
Tuesday, November 14, 2006
The article makes the mistake of saying that abalone shells are made from calcium carbonate, the same thing that chalk is made from. This is a lot like saying that pencil lead is made from carbon, the same thing that diamonds are made from. If the top scientific magazine in the country can not get simple materials science right, how can the general public be expected to learn anything? While the chemical composition of calcium carbonate in chalk and abalone shells is the same, the microstructure is very different, and this is an article about materials science so they should at least make an attempt to get it right.
I also find it interesting that she took two of the hottest areas of science, phage display and quantum dots, and combined them to yield some highly cited scientific publications. This sort of synthetic thinking, gets scientists with the right public relations machinery behind them a long way.
Self improvement is rarely talked about in the mainstream media today. I find it quite admirable that Professor Belcher intends to familiarize and involve herself with a new field every five years.
Sunday, November 12, 2006
In a recent column (November 10) called "China: Scapegoat or Sputnik?" Friedman first offers a good one-sentence summary of his giant bestseller "The World is Flat": "Technology and globalization are flattening the global economic playing field today, enabling many more developing nations to compete for white-collar and blue-collar jobs once reserved for the developed world." He then notes that this might be correlated with "median wage stagnation" in the U.S. - wages for the vast majority of American workers (perhaps 80%) have barely increased, corrected for inflation, for 30 years (my numbers, not his). Friedman concludes with the following: "The big question for me is, how will President Bush and the Democratic Congress use China: as a scapegoat or a Sputnik? Will they use it as an excuse to avoid doing the hard things, because it's all just China'’s fault, or as an excuse to rally the country - as we did after the Soviets leapt ahead of us in the space race and launched Sputnik - to make the kind of comprehensive changes in health care, portability of pensions, entitlements and lifelong learning to give America's middle class the best tools possible to thrive? A lot of history is going to turn on that answer, because if people don't feel they have the tools or skills to thrive in a world without walls, the pressure to put up walls, especially against China, will steadily mount."
Yes. But what would it actually mean to take the Sputnik route? Throughout the first half of the 1950s, Congress had been unenthusiastic about the public funding of basic research: by 1956, its fifth year of operation, the NSF's budget was only about 13% of what federal research savant Vannevar Bush had originally recommended. American policymakers had already been provoked in 1955 when the National Research Council published a study, Soviet Professional Manpower, saying that U.S. was falling behind in training scientific and technical personnel. The NRC report helped Congress to see the wisdom of doubling at least the NSF's education budget in 1957. Sputnik was the world's first artificial satellite, and when the Soviets launched it in October of 1957 it was widely seen as confirmation that the West had lost its technological edge. By 1960, "the Foundation's appropriation for all activities was $159,200,000, almost ten times the 1956 level" and over 45 times its budget less than ten years before (figures from former NSF Director Alan T. Waterman). It's also worth noting that this Big Bang in federal funding was driven by military rather than commercial competition, and was not so much a response to market forces as a substitute for or at least supplement of them.
So treating China as Sputnik today implies two things. First, it implies some kind of research - or even industrial - policy complementing U.S. capital markets and consumers as technology agenda-setters. Second it implies exponential and not just incremental research funding growth. Both of these may be necessary for globalization to be the win-win Friedman and most other people want it to be. Are either of these in the cards?
Saturday, November 11, 2006
Whether it is good science or not, the idea of tiny robots and molecular self-assembly was what generated a good deal of the early public and political interest in nano. Look at Drexler's 1992 testimony before a Senate subcommittee convened by then-Senator Albert Gore (D-TN). The role of public imagination in the formulation of public policy is a dimension well worth considering. See, for instance:
Howard E. McCurdy. Space and the American Imagination:. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997.
So, while I'm not losing sleep about the nanobots, I don't want to forget about them either.
Another point - while there is a great deal of claimsmaking about the interdisciplinary nature of nano - and these may be true - like a good (former) scientist, I still want to see the proof. The formation of MSE was a long and contested process and one which many metallurgists fought tooth and claw. Although I don't agree with everything she presents, for one perspective on this process, see:
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent. "The construction of a discipline: Materials science in the United States." Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 31, no. Part 2 (2001): 223-248.
Is anything like this happening with nano? Where are the turf wars?
Friday, November 10, 2006
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
to see if I was right. The process used, according to the press release, involves creating a nanoscale oxide layer.
This raises a good question - When do we call something nanotechnology or nanoscience? By a strict definition, it does or at least part of the manufacturing process does. But even the press release refers to its having been made using "standard silicon manufacturing processes." Nano or no nano?
Tuesday, November 07, 2006
Article info link (accessible through UCSB):
Learning at the nanoscale: Research questions that the rapidly
evolving interdisciplinarity of science poses for the learning
sciences (read it)
Sunday, November 05, 2006
Thursday, November 02, 2006
Two things struck me as especially interesting about them. One: Nano and society research varies considerably in the degree to which it actually concerns nano. Some of the talks I heard today addressed broader topics such as privacy, regulation, public engagement, and so forth that actually have little specifically to do with nano itself. Addressing privacy and public engagement, just to give two examples, could be done without ever considering nano. While this represents only my personal view, I think it important for people to get inside the subject and address what is particular special, to look for the "nano-ness" in other words. Or to paraphrase Langdon Winner, to open up the "nano-box" and see what's inside.
Second, I am also struck by how a good deal of the focus on nano has shifted to issues of environmental, health, and safety issues. I find this striking because, in my recollection, the EPA, OSHA, and the FDA were not participating agencies when the U.S. government first funded the National nanotech Initiative in 2000. I think it would make a small yet useful history project for someone to investigate when and how these regulatory agencies became part of the nano enterprise. Any takers?
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
The 4S program, for instance, can be viewed at: http://www.4sonline.org/27Oct4SFull_PROG.pdf
I'll try to take some time in the next frew days to offer some comments on the general themes discussed. More anon,
"Nanotechnology: risks and the media" by S.M. Friedman and B.P. Egolf
"Getting the best from nanotechnology: approaching social and ethical implications openly and proactively"
by K. Mills and C. Fleddermann
...and I haven't looked at these at all, but if you want to go all the way back to 2004 (vol. 23, issue 4):
"Nanotechnology controversies - Guest Editorial" by E.J. Woodhouse
"Nanotechnology: from Feynman to the grand challenge of molecular manufacturing" by C.L. Peterson
"The politics of small things: nanotechnology, risk, and uncertainty" by J. Wilsdon
"Does existing law fail to address nanotechnoscience?" by M. Bennett
"Anticipating military nanotechnology" by J. Altmann and M. Gubrud
"Nanotechnology's worldview: new space for old cosmologies" by A. Nordmann
"Societal dimensions of nanotechnology" by M.E. Gorman, J.F. Groves, and R.K. Catalano
The Dance of Molecules: How Nanotechnology Is Changing Our Lives. Ted Sargent. x + 234 pp. Thunder's Mouth Press, 2006. $25.
Nano-Hype: The Truth Behind the Nanotechnology Buzz. David Berube. Foreword by Mihail C. Roco. 521 pp. Prometheus Books, 2006. $28.